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Moving at a Glacial Pace: What Can State Attorneys General Do about SEC Inattention to
Nondisclosure of Financially Material Risks arising from Climate Change?1
I.

Introduction

In recent years, two certainties have created a mass of uncertainty for public companies.
First, companies must disclose material financial information in their annual statements, known
as 10-Ks, to the SEC. Second, climate change poses financial risks to the way businesses
operate. Together, these principles have generated significant uncertainty within the regulatory
and law enforcement arenas. Specifically, companies and law enforcement officials are
uncertain about what risks stemming from climate change must be disclosed in 10-Ks, and how
that information should be presented.
The actor primarily responsible for clarifying disclosure requirements is the Securities &
Exchange Commission (SEC). This Note will argue that the SEC’s most recent attempt to
address this uncertainty—a 2010 interpretive release—is inadequate, and that the SEC should
issue additional guidance. As the SEC has not been active on this issue in the past four years
despite promising further action on climate change disclosure, the Note will then argue that state
attorneys general, particularly the New York Attorney General, should attempt to address this
inaction through use of state securities laws and other advocacy tools.
Before addressing the proposed solution, Part II of this Note will detail the federal
securities disclosure regime currently in place, and discuss the SEC’s approval of its 2010
interpretive release. Part II will also outline the events leading to the interpretive release,
specifically the actions taken by then-Attorney General Andrew Cuomo (D–New York). Part III
will then argue that further guidance from the SEC is necessary, and that current New York
Attorney General Eric Schneiderman is best positioned to force SEC action and otherwise
1

Forthcoming 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. __ (2015).
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provide companies and law enforcement with a framework for disclosure requirements. Part III
will also discuss ways in which other state attorneys general could contribute to New York’s
efforts.

II.

Securities Regulation and Climate Change

A. Federal disclosure requirements imposed by the SEC
Securities regulation at the federal level began with the passage of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1933.2 The Act created the SEC and imposed a number of procedural
requirements on companies intending to sell securities, including the obligation to file 10-K
statements.3 In 1934, Congress passed a second Securities Exchange Act, which refined the
periodic reporting requirements, and authorized the SEC to issue rules and regulations related to
disclosure requirements.4 The four regulations most relevant to disclosure of risks arising from
climate change were promulgated using this authority.5
The first of these relevant regulations, Item 101, requires a description of all material
information related to an entity’s business operations.6 For instance, companies must disclose
information about the financial impacts of complying with existing environmental laws.7
Second, Item 102 requires that companies disclose pending legal proceedings that could have a
material impact on business operations, including proceedings involving environmental claims.8
In order to provide companies with guidance in this area, Instruction 5 clarifies that “ordinary
routine litigation incidental to the business” does not have to be reported, and sets forth the

2

15 U.S.C.A. § 77a–77aa (2014).
See generally id.
4
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a–78pp (2014).
5
15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(a)(2) (2014).
6
17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2014).
7
17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) and §229.101(h)(4)(xi) (2014).
8
17 C.F.R. § 229.102 (2014).
3
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criteria for what is not considered “ordinary routine litigation.”9 Item 303, known as
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), requires companies to discuss trends and
uncertainties facing their business.10 Under Item 303, management has great flexibility to decide
what constitutes a material trend or uncertainty; for instance there is no time frame set for the
analysis.11 The last requirement is Item 503, in which a company must provide information
about investments that might be considered particularly risky or speculative.12
To determine what is generally considered “material” both the courts and the SEC have
offered clarification. Supreme Court doctrine, subsequently adopted by the SEC, has held that
information is material “if there is a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’
of information made available.”13 The SEC has also attempted to provide greater certainty about
materiality by stating that something that affects less than 5% of a company’s income may be
immaterial, but the 5% threshold should not be viewed as dispositive.14
i.

SEC interpretive release on disclosure of climate change risks

In recent years, a major challenge for companies has been determining what risks from
climate change constitute “material information” that must be disclosed in their 10-K

9

Id. Instruction 5.
17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2014).
11
Management’s Discussion & Analysis of Financial Condition & Results of Operations; Certain Investment
Company Disclosures, Release Nos. 33-6835, 34-26831, IC-16961, 43 S.E.C. Docket 1330 (May 18, 1989)
(reiterating that “[t]he MD&A requirements are intentionally flexible and general”); see also Michael Gollub,
Reducing Uncertainty in Environmental Disclosure: Why the Securities and Exchange Commission Should Return to
the Basics, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 311, 366 (1998) (discussing Item 303, which requires disclosure of “known trends,” but
noting that “the line between known, uncertain events and those that are unknown is cloudy”). Item 303 presents the
least likely basis for enforcement challenges, even those based on nondisclosure, as the SEC’s position is that the
provision of most information defined as “forward-looking” is voluntary. Suzanne J. Romajas, The Duty to Disclose
Forward-Looking Information: A Look at the Future of MD&A, 61 Fordham L. Rev. S245, S253 (1993).
12
17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (2014).
13
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150 (Aug. 12, 1999) (quoting TSC
Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
14
Id.
10
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statements.15 The acknowledgment that certain environmental risks must be reported is itself not
novel; the SEC first issued a number of regulations and interpretive releases on environmental
risks in the 1970s and 1980s.16 However, the SEC did not attempt to refine or update these
documents to deal specifically with climate change until 2010.17 The 2010 interpretive release
first emphasizes that it should not be interpreted to impose any new reporting requirements, but
provides clarification of obligations under “existing disclosure requirements.”18 It also
highlights the fact that a number of companies have voluntarily disclosed more in-depth
information related to climate change to non-governmental organizations, and warns that some
of that information may be responsive to SEC requirements (although which information is
responsive is not identified).19 With respect to how climate change may affect a company’s
financial position, the SEC noted that climate change might have significant impacts on
“personnel, physical assets, supply chain and distribution chain.”20 The most useful portion of
the interpretive release is a list of what may have a material effect on a company: 1) impact of
legislation and regulation; 2) international accords; 3) indirect consequences of regulation and
business trends; and 4) physical impacts of climate change.21
B. Events leading to the SEC’s 2010 interpretive release on climate change disclosure
The impetus for the 2010 interpretive release came not from the SEC, but from the efforts
of outside groups, most notably the Attorney General of New York. Between 2007 and 2010,
15

See, e.g., Rick Hansen, Climate Change Disclosure by SEC Registrants: Revisiting the SEC’s 2010 Interpretive
release, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 487, 490 (2012) (“A particular challenge for registrants is determining
what they should be saying in their SEC filings about the effects of climate change on their businesses.”).
16
See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change (Feb. 8,
2010), 10–11, http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf (discussion on 1970s-1980s promulgation of
current rules related to disclosure of environmental risks) [hereinafter “Commission Guidance”].
17
See generally id.
18
Id. at 3.
19
See id. at 8–10.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 22–27.
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then-Attorney General Andrew Cuomo undertook a series of investigations and submitted
petitions to the SEC to obtain the interpretive release.
i.

2007 Efforts
a. Petitioning the SEC

In 2007, General Cuomo joined a group of institutional investors and environmental
groups to petition the SEC for interpretive guidance about what information must be disclosed
with respect to risks arising from climate change.22 The petition stressed that the parties sought
only clarification of requirements “under existing law” and not the imposition of new disclosure
requirements.23 Due to what the parties considered to be a widespread problem of nondisclosure of
information related to climate change, the petition primarily sought a clear statement from the SEC
that such disclosure may be material and therefore subject to federal disclosure requirements.24
Further, the petition asked the SEC to demand that registrants make calculations, where feasible, in
order to assess the materiality of such information.25 The demand for such calculations and
information was considered reasonable despite the complex science behind climate change because
the SEC had required similar information from companies in fields including biotechnology and
pharmaceuticals.26
Much of the petition was devoted to detailing the increased awareness, by both investors and
corporations, of financial risks posed by climate change.27 For instance, the petition described a
number of studies on rates and quality of disclosure to highlight the inconsistency of disclosure

22

Request for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, File No. 4-547, Sept. 18, 2007, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions.shtml.
23
Id. at 2.
24
Id. at 9.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 12.
27
See generally id.
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across the corporate sector.28 The petition also acknowledged that there were private entities offering
to perform analyses of companies’ climate change risks, but rejected the idea that the existence of
these entities was sufficient to provide interested investors with such information.29 The petition
asserted that this kind of material information was responsive to federal disclosure requirements and
must be made available to the public at large without cost to the investors.30 Moreover, reliance on
private entities created a risk of biased analyses in that analysts might provide more favorable
evaluations for fear of otherwise being denied business or information from their clients.31
In addition to the petition, the signatories submitted a separate letter to the SEC requesting
immediate action on the enforcement side.32 Specifically, the letter requested that the SEC “devote
close attention to the adequacy of disclosures concerning climate risk, particularly by registrants in
industry sectors that emit high levels of greenhouse gases and those that are subject to regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions.”33

b. Investigations of energy companies
At the same time the petition was filed, Cuomo turned to the state Martin Act, New
York’s securities law, to investigate five energy companies that conducted business in New
York.34 Under the Martin Act, the Attorney General is empowered to investigate any suspected
deception or fraud in relation to securities, and combined with the Executive Act, the General
may investigate fraud in the context of any business activity.35 In this instance, Cuomo argued

28

Id. at 45–48.
Id. at 34–39.
30
Id. at 38.
31
Id. at 38–39 (citing Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,731
(Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 243 (2007)), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm.
32
Id. at 10.
33
Id.
34
NY CLS Gen. Bus. §§ 352–59 (2013); Press release, Energy Company Subpoenas, New York Attorney General
(Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/energy-companies-subpoenas.
35
Andrew Lorin, The Investment Protection Bureau: An Overview of Financial Markets Regulation and
Enforcement in New York, Initiative for Policy Dialogue, 2 (2006), available at
29
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that the companies failed to disclose material information related to climate change risks in their
SEC filings, and that “[s]elective disclosure of favorable information or omission of unfavorable
information concerning climate change is misleading.”36 To investigate these allegations,
Cuomo issued subpoenas “seeking information regarding [the companies’] analyses of [their]
climate risks and disclosures of such risks to investors.”37
The use of the Martin Act to investigate nondisclosure related to climate change was
unprecedented. Numerous media and legal periodicals stressed that the application of the Martin
Act to environmental issues was unusual, but also noted that aggressive use of the Martin Act
was not.38 Specifically, the aggressive use of the Martin Act to investigate corporations was
largely pioneered by Cuomo’s predecessor, Eliot Spitzer, and then continued by Cuomo.39 Prior
to Spitzer’s term in office, the Martin Act had been left unused except in regard to “uranium
boiler rooms and promoters of shady Canadian mining stock.”40 Once Spitzer took office, he
broke the “unspoken gentleman’s agreement” that the Martin Act would not be wielded against

http://policydialogue.org/events/meetings/financial_markets_reform_task_force_meeting_manchester_2006/material
s/.
36
See Subpoenas issued to AES Corp., Dominion Resources, Inc., Xcel Energy, Dynegy, Inc., and Peabody Energy,
available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/energy-companies-subpoenas.
37
Id.
38
See, e.g., Felicity Barringer & Danny Hakim, New York Subpoenas 5 Energy Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/nyregion/16greenhouse.html?_r=0 (“It is rare, if not unique, for a
securities law to be used for an environmental purpose”); Steve Raabe, Xcel Pueblo Site among Targets in N.Y. AG
Probe, DENVER POST, Sept. 17, 2007, at C1, available at 2007 WLNR 18204565 (noting that some might view the
investigation “as an unusual attempt to use securities law to advance an environmental agenda”).
39
See, e.g., Sarah Kelly-Kilgore, Ninety and Kicking? How New York’s Martin Act is only Getting Stronger with
Age, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (Feb. 7, 2011), http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/Drupal/blogs/blogentry/ninety-and-kicking-how-new-york%E2%80%99s-martin-act-only-getting-stronger-age-02-07-2011 (nothing
that Spitzer began using the Martin Act to combat fraud in the banking, hedge fund, and mutual fund industries);
Ashby Jones, Cuomo to E&Y: Let Me Introduce You to my Good Friend, Martin, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2010),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/12/21/cuomo-to-ey-let-me-introduce-you-to-my-good-friend-martin/ (indicating that
Cuomo used the Martin Act as aggressively as Spitzer to prosecute large financial entities such as Bank of America
in relation to the subprime mortgage crisis); Nicholas Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFFAIRS (May/June
2004), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2004/feature_thompson_mayjun04.msp (stating that “Spitzer
grasped its potential in a way that his predecessors hadn't,” leading him to undertake “merciless investigations”
targeting Wall Street).
40
Thompson, supra note 38.
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“the moneymen of Wall Street.”41 Instead, Spitzer obtained large settlements against Merrill
Lynch and other large financial institutions after investigating them for fraud.42
After Cuomo assumed the role of Attorney General, his Office continued Spitzer’s legacy
in the context of financial fraud. For instance, his office investigated Bank of America and
numerous other entities in relation to the subprime mortgage crisis.43 He also brought a case
against Bank of America for failing to disclose losses at Merrill Lynch, which Bank of America
had acquired in 2008.44 Thus, while using the Martin Act to force companies to disclose climate
change information was novel in terms of subject matter, the underlying strategy was not.
ii.

2008 Efforts
a. Supplemental petition to the SEC

After nearly one year of inaction on the September 2007 request for guidance, the
signatories submitted a supplemental petition to show their continued interest in obtaining an
interpretive release on climate change disclosure.45 The document reported on federal and state
hearings, regulations, and initiatives undertaken since the initial petition was filed, and again
pointed to numerous reports about investor interest in climate change disclosure.46 Even after
receiving this filing, the SEC did not take action.47
b. Initial settlements with energy companies

41

Id.
Id.
43
Kate Kelly, Amir Efrati & Ruth Simon, State Subprime Probe Takes a New Tack, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2008),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120173938230430417.
44
Michael Corkery, Andrew Cuomo and the Real Power of the Martin Act, WALL ST. J. DEAL JOURNAL (Feb. 4,
2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/02/04/ndrew-cuomo-and-the-real-power-of-the-martin-act/.
45
Supplemental Petition to File No. 4-547, June 12, 2008, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions.shtml.
46
Id.
47
See Supplemental Petition to File No. 4-547, Nov. 25, 2009, 2–4, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions.shtml (discussing the purpose of filing a second supplement petition and the lack
of SEC action on the 2007 petition).
42
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In August 2008, Cuomo’s office reached a settlement with Xcel Energy, one of the five
energy companies subpoenaed in 2007 for allegedly failing to disclose climate change risks.48
This settlement represented the “first-ever binding and enforceable agreement requiring a major
national energy company to disclose” financial risks related to climate change in subsequent 10K filings.49 Xcel Energy, an electricity and natural gas provider, allegedly failed to disclose
information related to a coal-fired electric generating unit that it was building.50 Specifically,
Xcel did not disclose how the new unit would impact its “financial, regulatory, and litigation
risks” with regards to increased emissions.51
Under the terms of the settlement, Xcel Energy was required to disclose material risks
stemming from three categories: present and probable future climate change regulation and
legislation; climate-change related litigation; and physical impacts of climate change.52
Additionally, Xcel Energy committed to providing specific data related to four topics. First,
Xcel Energy must provide its current carbon emissions.53 Second, the company must report any
projected increases in carbon emissions from planned coal-fired power plants.54 Third, the 10-K
must include all company strategies for reducing, offsetting, limiting, or otherwise managing its
global warming pollution emissions and expected global warming emissions reductions from
these actions.55 Last, Xcel Energy must report all corporate governance actions related to

48

Press release, Cuomo Announces Entergy to Back-Off on Plan that Would Have Cost NYS $ 432 Million Dollars,
New York Attorney General (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/cuomo-announces-entergy-backplan-would-have-cost-nys-432-million-dollars.
49
Id.
50
See Subpoena issued to Xcel Energy (Sept. 14, 2007), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/energycompanies-subpoenas.
51
Id.
52
Press release, Cuomo Announces Entergy to Back-Off on Plan that Would Have Cost NYS $ 432 Million Dollars,
supra note 47.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
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climate change, including whether environmental performance is incorporated into officer
compensation.56
Two months after reaching a settlement with Xcel Energy, Cuomo announced a second
agreement with Dynegy, Inc., a producer and seller of electric energy.57 The Attorney General’s
Office used its settlement with Xcel Energy as a template for what Dynegy must disclose in its
future SEC filings.58 At the time, Cuomo indicated that his investigations of the remaining three
energy companies were ongoing.59
iii.

2009 Efforts
a. Second supplemental petition to the SEC

In November 2009, the parties to the September 2007 petition persisted in their efforts to
obtain SEC guidance by filing a second supplemental petition.60 This supplement not only
provided updates about the regulatory climate, but also reiterated many of the conclusions in the
initial petition, particularly the fact that there was a consensus in the business community that
climate change posed financial risks to companies.61 Also highlighted were Cuomo’s
investigations of the five energy companies and details of the settlements reached with Xcel
Energy and Dynegy, Inc.62
b. Additional settlement with AES Corp.
Around the time that the second supplemental petition was filed, Cuomo’s Office
announced that it had reached a third settlement from its investigations into nondisclosure of
56

Id.
Press release, Attorney General Cuomo, Joined by Vice President Gore, Announces Agreement with Major Energy
Company, Dynegy, Inc., New York Attorney General (Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorneygeneral-cuomo-joined-vice-president-gore-announces-agreement-major-energy.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Supplemental Petition to File No. 4-547, Nov. 25, 2009, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions.shtml.
61
See id.
62
Id. at 24–25.
57
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risks related to climate change. AES Corp. agreed to the same settlement terms imposed on Xcel
Energy and Dynegy, Inc.63 Cuomo hailed these three settlements as evidence that “[s]electively
revealing favorable facts or intentionally concealing unfavorable information about climate
change is misleading” to investors.64 By undertaking these investigations and continuing to
pursue companies for nondisclosure the Office was “rais[ing] the bar in the industry and
ensur[ing] transparency and disclosure in the marketplace.”65 Of the two companies still under
investigation, Cuomo indicated that the Office was continuing its efforts to reach agreements.66
To date, however, no public agreements have been disclosed.
c. Resulting SEC action
On February 8, 2010, the SEC finally issued its response to the 2007 petition submitted
by Cuomo and other organizations.67 The 2010 interpretive release, as described supra in Part
II.A.i., represented the first interpretive release specifically about climate change since investors
and other organizations had begun petitioning for clarification in 2007.68 The petition filed by
Cuomo and the other parties was the first such petition to be filed.69 Perhaps encouraged by
Cuomo’s filing, additional petitions were submitted in 2007 by other entities including the Free
Enterprise Fund.70

63

Press release, Attorney General Cuomo Announces Agreement with AES to Disclose Climate Change Risks to
Investors, New York Attorney General (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-generalcuomo-announces-agreement-aes-disclose-climate-change-risks-investors.
64
Press release, Cuomo Announces Entergy to Back-Off On Plan that Would Have Cost NYS $ 432 Million Dollars,
supra note 47.
65
Press release, Attorney General Cuomo, Joined By Vice President Gore, Announces Agreement With Major
Energy Company, Dynegy, Inc., supra note 56.
66
Press release, Attorney General Cuomo Announces Agreement with AES to Disclose Climate Change Risks to
Investors, supra note 62.
67
Commission Guidance, supra note 15.
68
See id. at 7 n.20.
69
Id.
70
Id.
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III.

Why and How to Obtain Clarification of Federal Disclosure Requirements

Now that the SEC has issued an interpretation of disclosure requirements that is specific
to climate change, what, if anything, remains to be done? This Part will first set out why
additional guidance is necessary. Based on this need for regulatory action, and the fact that, as a
general matter, an agency cannot be forced to act where it possesses the discretion to exercise its
regulatory authority,71 it is clear that any attempt to force the agency to issue further guidance
must go beyond direct in-court action (i.e. suing the SEC for failure to issue an interpretive
release). This Part will argue that the best solution is to have New York resume the efforts
begun under General Cuomo (discussed supra in Part II.B.). Last, this Part will also suggest
ways in which other state attorneys general can assist New York and otherwise play an active
role in obtaining SEC guidance.
A. Why is additional guidance on disclosure necessary?
i.

Both rates and quality of disclosure are inconsistent even between companies
within the same industry

Disclosure rates and the quality of disclosure were inconsistent prior to the issuance of
the SEC’s 2010 interpretive release, and remain so today. This section will address studies
conducted from both before and after the issuance of the 2010 interpretive release to assess
whether and how the SEC’s action influenced companies’ reporting practices.
a. Disclosure prior to the 2010 interpretive release

71

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (stating that “an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action
should be presumed immune from judicial review under § 701(a)(2) [of the APA]”); cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497 (2007).
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Prior to the issuance of the SEC’s 2010 interpretive release, disclosure between
companies varied dramatically even between companies in the same industry.72 For instance,
some energy companies, including AES Corp., disclosed quantitative estimates of environmental
risks, including the methodology used to arrive at their figures (although AES’s disclosure
practices are the result of the New York investigation discussed supra).73 Other energy
companies, including Blacksands Petroleum, Inc., even after being asked by the SEC to clarify
an annual 10-K, provided only the following regarding climate change: “Products produced by
the oil and natural gas exploration and production industry are a source of certain GHGs, namely
carbon dioxide and methane, and future restrictions on the combustion of fossil fuels or the
venting of natural gas could have a significant impact on our future operations.”74 Non-energy
companies often did not address environmental risks at all, but when such risks were identified,
they were often presented in generic statements such as, “business operations are subject to
numerous environmental and other air pollution control laws.”75
A survey of 10-K filings from 1995 to 2008 concluded that there was “an alarming
pattern of non-disclosure by corporations regarding climate change risks.”76 Specifically, a
“large majority of S&P 500 companies neglect[ed] to even mention climate risk,” and the
disclosure provided was often superficial, which “demonstrates the fundamental failure [by the

72

See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 14, at 508–09 (discussing a GAO study of 20 electric utilities and noting that the
quality of disclosure varied between companies); see generally Kevin L. Doran & Elias L. Quinn, Climate Change
Risk Disclosure: A Sector by Sector Analysis of SEC 10-K Filings from 1995-2008, 34 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
721, 763 (2009).
73
AES Corp., Form 10-K (filed Feb. 26, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/874761/000119312510041006/d10k.htm; Jim Coburn, Sean H. Donahue,
& Suriya Jayanti, Disclosing Climate Risks & Opportunities in SEC Filings, CERES, 20 (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter
“Ceres 2011 Report”].
74
Blacksands Petroleum, Inc., Correspondence to the SEC Re: Form 10-K for Fiscal year Ended Oct. 31, 2011 (filed
Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1308137/000147793213000197/filename1.htm.
75
Dean Foods Co., Form 10-K (filed Feb. 25, 2010),
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/931336/000119312510039767/d10k.htm.
76
Doran & Quinn, supra note 71, at 763.
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SEC] to implement securities law and protect investors.”77 For instance, in 2008, less than 25%
of the companies listed on the S&P Index made any reference to climate change.78 In one of the
sectors comprising the largest percent of the S&P Index (6.2%), utilities, disclosure was highest
with all but one company making some mention of climate change.79 However, the utilities’
disclosure quality varied, and despite increasing in length from previous years, most 10-K
statements were “cursory in their discussion and insubstantial in their analysis of risk.”80 Based
on these sector-by-sector analyses and the fact that, overall, 76.3% of the S&P 500 companies
failed to mention climate change, the study determined that both industrial and non-industrial
companies would benefit from additional guidance to appropriately deal with direct and indirect
risks.81
b. Disclosure after the 2010 interpretive release
After the 2010 interpretive release was issued, disclosure rates increased, although the
quality remains suspect in many cases.82 For instance, Ceres studied disclosure rates among the
S&P 500 companies between 2009 and 2013, and concluded that, after the 2010 interpretive
release, disclosure rates increased from 45% of all S&P 500 companies to 59%, but the overall
quality and specificity of the disclosures dropped.83 Rather than “fulfill the SEC’s expectation,”
set out in its 2010 interpretive release, that companies would discuss material risks related to four

77

Id. at 764.
Id. at 733.
79
Id. at 735–36.
80
Id. at 742.
81
Id. at 764.
82
See, e.g., Ceres 2011 Report, supra note 72, at 5 (citing ISS Corporate Services Study); Press release, New ISS
Corporate Services Report Highlights Need for Improved Company Disclosure Per New SEC Climate Risk
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categories84 in a “meaningful” way, the companies are treating climate change risks with brevity
and superficiality.85
ISS Corporate Services also reviewed disclosure of the 100 largest companies in the
United States, and determined that of the 51 companies including any reference to financial risks
related to climate change, only 24 mentioned physical risks to their assets and 22 noted future
business opportunities that could arise from climate change.86 Additionally, the National
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) has noted that although the 2010 interpretive release
seems to have instigated somewhat higher disclosure rates, a sizeable portion of companies did
not report anything and disclosure rates remain less “widespread or as extensive as some would
like.”87
ii.

Various stakeholders, including investors and executives, have recognized that
improved disclosure is desirable to protect and assist shareholders in making
informed investment decisions
The SEC has acknowledged that “[t]here have been increasing calls for climate-related

disclosures by shareholders” as “reflected in the several petitions for interpretive advice
submitted by large institutional investors and other investor groups.”88 For instance, the petition
that ultimately led to the 2010 interpretive release was submitted by 41 parties, including “some
of the nation’s largest public pension funds, state treasurers, controllers and comptrollers, asset
managers, foundations and other institutional investors with approximately $1.4 trillion in assets
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under management.”89 In sum, the SEC’s response to the petition is itself an acknowledgement
that, in particular, “carbon-intensive industries have an obligation to inform investors of the
material risks that climate change may pose to their companies.”90
Moreover, as the petition stressed, investors are not interested based purely on “moral or
policy interest,” but also for financial reasons.91 Specifically, investors may be seeking out
companies “best positioned to avoid the financial risks associated with climate change and to
capitalize on the new opportunities that greenhouse gas regulation will provide.”92 Corporate
executives also acknowledge that climate change poses a risk to share value. In a 2006 survey of
4,000 international executives, climate change was identified as the third most commonly cited risk
to companies.93

iii.

Providing more precise guidance is not an impossible request, and the SEC has given
more concrete instruction with respect to other securities regulations
While it is true that some variance in disclosure is inevitable due to the fact-specific

nature of the analysis, the SEC could provide more “best practice” guidance about when
companies should attempt to provide quantitative information and provide the methodology used
in such an analysis. Specific examples or illustrations have been provided in other contexts to
assist companies with compliance. For instance, Rule 14a-9, which addresses false and
misleading statements made in proxy statements, includes official notes that give examples of
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such statements.94 The Rule itself states only that “[n]o solicitation . . . shall be made . . .
containing any statement which . . . is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or
which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false
or misleading.”95 This text is arguably imprecise with regards to which types of statements
might be considered misleading. However, the SEC followed the Rule with a clarifying note.
“[S]ome examples of what . . .may be misleading” include “[p]redictions as to specific future
market values” and “[m]aterial which directly or indirectly impugns character, integrity or
personal reputation . . . without factual foundation.”96 Similarly, as noted in Part II, the SEC has
stated that, in order to help companies assess what is material information, the 5% threshold,
while not determinative, may be a useful guideline.97
Along these lines, examples or baselines of what should be disclosed could be issued
with respect to disclosure of climate change. For instance, the SEC could issue an interpretation
that included hypothetical illustrations and suggest when a company ought to calculate, if
reasonably possible, costs related to compliance with pending regulations that are either likely to
be passed or scheduled to take effect in the coming fiscal year.98 Or, the SEC could provide an
example of how a company might decide whether a trend is certain enough that it will materially
affect its financial position.99 Further, setting out instances where quantitative information
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should be provided, if possible, would be helpful, and the SEC has often requested such
information from registrants in other contexts.100
This information would improve the quality of 10-K statements by making the
information more accessible and meaningful to investors and authorities that are struggling to
interpret the information that is disclosed and determine whether to take action against
companies for misleading information or nondisclosure. Additionally, any potential increase in
compliance costs to the companies may be less than what the companies gain from added
certainty about what they should be disclosing.101 Even without setting a particular method of
assessing materiality, such guidelines would set a baseline from which state and federal
authorities could begin enforcement proceedings and on which companies could model their
approach to disclosure. On a related issue, institutional investors have frequently indicated through
shareholder proposals that they are concerned with and would like to change the substantive
environmental practices of companies.102 Increased disclosure may be one method for determining
whether or not those changes are warranted or effective as such information may not otherwise be
available to interested investors.

It may seem obvious that certain information should be disclosed (e.g. impact of
environmental legislation on physical assets). As the quality of disclosure indicates, however,
companies appear to disagree about where environmental impacts (particularly potential, rather
100
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than certain, impacts – e.g. pending regulations and trends in energy usage or production)
become material.103 Thus, although the SEC may think it simple to determine what should be
included in 10-K statements, offering more concrete guidance to companies would transfer the
Commission’s assumptions to the public sphere and reduce the potential for uncertainty.
iv.

The SEC has promised further engagement with the issue of climate change-related
disclosure, but has largely failed to follow through on this promise
After issuing its 2010 interpretive release, the SEC promised to take further steps to

address climate change disclosure. Despite this promise, which is consistent with its practice of
“refin[ing] its interpretive guidance over a period of years to better define what it expects of
registrants,”104 very little action has occurred. NACD has characterized the SEC’s enforcement
and monitoring responses as “muted” and “not particularly proactive.”105 For instance, in the
2010 interpretive release, the SEC announced that it would hold a public roundtable discussion
related to climate change,106 but never followed through with its promise.107 Further, the SEC
resolved to monitor climate change disclosure through its Investor Advisory Committee,108 but
the Committee was subsequently dissolved.109 Although a new advisory committee was
established in 2012, “it has not yet provided any recommendations related to climate change
disclosure.”110
Last, in the enforcement arena, the SEC has issued a total of 52 letters to companies and
asset managers (out of a total of over 45,000 such letters) requesting information related to
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climate change.111 Of these letters, 38 were issued in 2010, and the rate of issuance has
consistently declined since then, with no letters related to climate change issued in 2013.112 Not
only is the quantity of letters small, but also the requests to the companies primarily asked only
what, if any, consideration they gave to the 2010 interpretive release in making their securities
filings.113 Based on these requests, 12 companies made revisions or promised to change
practices in the future; and of those that made revisions, half indicated either that climate change
did not pose a material risk or committed to discussing it in the future.114 Overall, the small
quantity of letters and generic requests from the SEC indicates “minimal attention” to disclosure
of climate change risks, and suggests that there is no “ongoing SEC commitment to implement”
the interpretive release.115
B. How can state attorneys general address the need for further SEC guidance?
In light of the fact that further clarification of climate change disclosure requirements is
needed, this section will propose that the New York Attorney General’s Office reassert its
leadership on this issue through the two-part solution undertaken by General Cuomo. Under
General Schneiderman, this issue has not been actively pursued, except for one instance in 2011
(detailed infra). This section proposes that the Office reconsider making it a priority, and will
argue that this is consistent with Schneiderman’s agenda and conception of the Office’s mission.
In particular, the Office should continue working with coalitions to petition the SEC for further
guidance, outlining continued inconsistencies in quality of disclosure (see Part II supra). The
Office should also continue raising the political salience of the issue as a means of pressuring the
SEC. This can be accomplished by using the Martin Act, when deemed appropriate, to
111

Id. at 20.
Id. at 21.
113
Id. at 23.
114
Id. at 25.
115
Id.
112

Page 21 of 47

investigate companies for failure to disclose risks related to climate change, and issuing press
releases or holding press conferences related to these efforts.
For a variety of reasons discussed infra, the New York Attorney General is best
positioned to lead the states on this issue. These reasons include particular facets of the Martin
Act; the presence of political will in New York to address both climate change and SEC inaction;
and an inability of private plaintiffs to obtain similar results under both federal and state law.
i.

Can a state attorney general provoke SEC action?

Before addressing the specific details of this Note’s proposal, the power of a state
attorney general to provoke federal agency action must be addressed. Although it is difficult to
prove absolutely that Cuomo’s efforts factored into the SEC’s decision to issue the 2010
interpretive release, there is evidence to suggest that his Office’s investigations combined with
the 2007 petition influenced the SEC. This subsection will first address potential reasons for
SEC inaction on disclosure of climate change risks, and then will argue that Cuomo’s efforts
influenced the SEC’s decision to issue the 2010 interpretive release.
a. Prior SEC inaction
As noted supra, prior to the 2010 interpretive release, the SEC had not issued any climate
change-specific regulations or releases in recent years. The political nature of climate change
may explain why the SEC has been hesitant to offer advice to companies in this area.
Specifically, climate change and environmental law more generally is a highly partisan issue.116
Thus, the SEC may have wished to avoid “taking sides” in the debate, particularly since the
Commission itself is split along party lines with three Democratic Commissioners and two
116
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Republicans.117 Bearing out this theory is the fact that the 2010 Guidance itself was approved by
a 3-2 party-line vote.118 Further, the Commission attempted to distance itself from the
appearance that it was weighing in on the debate by stating that it “is not making any kind of
statement regarding the facts as they relate to the topic of ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’”
(emphasis in original).119 If the SEC needed additional proof that issuing guidance related to
climate change would be politically controversial, then Congress willingly provided it. Soon
after the 2010 interpretive release was issued, over 20 representatives wrote to the SEC
expressing their opposition to it.120 Another contingent of the Senate and House introduced
legislation to repeal it, but the bills were unsuccessful.121
The second reason that the SEC may have failed to enforce or otherwise issue interpretive
guidance in this area is “agency capture.” Some scholars have posited that regulatory vacuums
within the SEC are due to the fact that it has fallen victim to “capture by the very special
interests it was ostensibly regulating.”122 In this case, the companies that might suffer the most
from more strictly enforced disclosure requirements are those who have often been favored
historically by the SEC.123 Agency capture can occur indirectly as well.124 As a former SEC
117
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Chairman noted, because regulated entities are well financed and well positioned to lobby
Congress, the Commission has, at times, been “constantly threatened with budget cuts by . . .
congressional overseers if it pursued aggressive regulations,” and therefore refrained for
acting.125
Another reason that the SEC may not have addressed climate change earlier is a lack of
resources.126 In other contexts, the SEC has defended its actions or lack thereof by stating that
its budget forces prioritization, and that it cannot even aggressively pursue all the investigations
that it does choose to undertake (resulting in settlements criticized by outsiders and federal
judges alike).127 In the face of competing priorities, it is possible that disclosure of risks arising
from climate change fell toward the bottom of the SEC’s agenda. However, whether lack of
resources, agency capture, or an unwillingness to engage in a partisan debate (or a combination
of these factors) better explains the SEC’s prior inaction on disclosure, these theories strongly
suggest that without outside pressure, in this case, Cuomo’s actions, the SEC would not have
issued its 2010 interpretive release at all.
b. Strategies for combatting federal agency inaction
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There are two major challenges facing states and other actors attempting to force state
action. First, there is the principle of federal preemption. In the context of securities disclosure
and registration, states are largely preempted in that they may not impose additional or separate
requirements on federally registered companies.128 Second, agency inaction is largely immune to
judicial review,129 and “lawsuits targeting agency performance more generally have found little
judicial receptivity.”130 Combined, these principles can “create a vast unregulated domain when
federal agencies do not enforce their regulations.”131 Thus, states must be creative in their
approach to persuading the SEC to issue interpretive releases or otherwise take enforcement
action.
One approach to filling the regulatory void, and which provided the basis for Cuomo’s
strategy, was pioneered by his predecessor, Eliot Spitzer. While Spitzer’s approach was not
aimed at forcing SEC action in the same way as Cuomo’s, but rather to act in place of the SEC, it
remains relevant to the problem addressed here. Specifically, it serves as an example of the
competitive dynamic that can exist when state and federal governments have concurrent
authority to enforce federal law. When the state and federal governments disagree about
enforcement levels, each actor may independently make its own judgment and use its own
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resources to pursue actions as it sees fit.132 Thus, where states perceive a regulatory void, as
Spitzer did, they may seek to increase their own enforcement efforts, and thereby act as a
substitute for the federal agency.133
In the early and mid-2000s, faced with what Spitzer considered to be the SEC’s failure to
act in the face of financial wrongdoing, his Office turned to the Martin Act to combat financial
crimes.134 Specifically, at the time Spitzer took office, there had been a number of market
scandals involving conflicts of interest and other fraudulent practices such as the filing of false
analyst reports.135 Despite these scandals, the SEC had “been slow in pursuing” actions against
the perpetrators.136 Critics alleged the agency was in a “deep slumber . . . [along with] other
important financial regulators.”137 Using the state Martin Act, Spitzer began what has been
characterized as a “‘hostile takeover’ of the SEC.”138 Through his Office’s investigations of the
financial entities involved in these scandals, Spitzer made the issues “politically salient, much to
the embarrassment and discomfort of the SEC.”139 Although it could be argued that Spitzer was
simply attempting to fill the void left by the SEC, he acknowledged that one goal of these
investigations was to “be a catalyst for reform.”140 To an extent, he was successful. For
instance, after his Office began investigating Putnam, a hedge fund, for illegal trading
transactions, and publicly exposed the wrongdoing, both Massachusetts and the SEC began
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separate investigations.141 Prior to Spitzer’s investigation, the SEC had been tipped off to the
abusive practices but not undertaken any inquiry.142 Thus, Spitzer’s efforts likely contributed to
the SEC’s own investigation.143
In contrast to Spitzer’s approach, Cuomo’s strategy actively sought a direct response
from the SEC in its role as a “lawmaker” rather than just as an enforcer.144 Due to this goal,
Cuomo could not rely solely on Spitzer’s example of aggressively using the Martin Act; rather,
he had to make a direct request to the SEC for guidance.145 Thus, the adoption of the two-step
approach discussed in detail supra (Part II.B.). The first step, filing a petition, was necessary to
engage the attention of the SEC in its capacity as a policymaker. Once engaged, retaining
attention, even in the face of continued inaction, was critical to emphasize the importance of the
issue; thus, the filing of the two supplemental petitions.146 Without clear direction as to what
Cuomo wanted from the SEC, it is possible that the SEC could have more easily continued its
silence on climate change disclosure.
While placing pressure on the SEC by calling for guidance was a necessary step, the
second step of undertaking investigations under state law was at least as important in ultimately
obtaining the 2010 interpretive release. Specifically, there is some evidence to suggest that
Cuomo’s highly publicized investigations provided the necessary catalyst for agency action. For
instance, when the SEC finally responded to the petitions, it expressly acknowledged Cuomo’s
141
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investigations, stating that “[t]he New York Attorney General’s Office has entered into
settlement agreements with three energy companies,” and then detailed the disclosure
requirements placed on those companies.147 This statement, and the response of the energy
companies to Cuomo’s investigations, suggests that the SEC decided to act to protect its own
role as the ultimate source and determiner of federal disclosure guidelines. For instance, the
energy companies likely did not disclose out of fear of SEC enforcement (as the agency had not
signaled any intent to investigate), but rather because of Cuomo’s direct involvement.148 Further,
a study of 10-Ks in 2008 concluded that the entire utility sector led all industries in terms of at
least mentioning climate change risks, but emphasized that this sector “had reason to be
particularly careful” due to Cuomo’s subpoenas to five energy companies.149
Viewed through the lens of cooperative federalism, which suggests that concurrent
enforcement presents states with the opportunity to impose “novel interpretations of federal law”
on regulated entities,150 the SEC’s response seems to be an example of an agency attempting to
prevent just such an opportunity. As Cuomo himself made clear, the investigations were not
undertaken just to publicize the issue of climate change disclosure, but also to begin establishing
a baseline for other companies in the absence of SEC guidance. Specifically, after filing the
lawsuits, he emphasized that increasing disclosure is “a priority for us.”151 Even after reaching
three landmark settlements, Cuomo signaled his intent to continue pursuing companies for
similar violations, stating, “my office’s initiative to make sure companies are up front with
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investors continues.”152 Moreover, his Office strategically chose to pursue companies in the
same line of business and imposed the same settlement terms on all of them.153
The regulatory scheme governing securities laws and the historic behavior of the SEC
also makes it more likely that the SEC would feel threatened in its role as a lawmaking body by
Cuomo’s investigations. Specifically, under the existing regulatory regime, although the states
may not impose separate disclosure requirements on companies, they may bring actions
independent of and parallel to the SEC’s own investigations for nondisclosure.154 Furthermore,
“the SEC has no right to intervene in state proceedings.”155 Thus, where the result of a state
action, as here, will be to provide concrete content to existing disclosure requirements, the SEC
will either have to accept the consequences or intervene in its lawmaking capacity.
Although it may be argued that the regulatory void is not the same as when Spitzer was
the Attorney General,156 and assuming that the SEC responded in 2010 because it felt the state
was encroaching on its authority, then it is likely that the SEC will continue to be wary of state
action in this area. The key fact, which is that the states are preempted from imposing additional
filing or disclosure requirements on entities registered with the SEC, remains firmly in place.157
This feature differentiates the SEC’s relationship with the states from that of some other
consumer-oriented agencies; for instance, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
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may not prohibit states from imposing additional consumer protection rules on national banks
unless the state rules are inconsistent with the federal laws.158 Thus, unlike the OCC, which may
be less likely to respond to state action due to its inability to interfere unless such actions are
inconsistent with federal statutes, the SEC has a greater incentive to intervene and protect its
authority to control the content of 10-Ks.
ii.

Why is New York best positioned to force SEC action?
a. The Martin Act contains features that render it more powerful than the
securities laws in other states

New York’s Martin Act, just one of the numerous blue sky laws in effect, is often
characterized as the most powerful in the nation.159 There are a number of reasons for this, not
the least of which is the generous interpretation of “fraud” that the New York courts have
fashioned from the text of the statute.160 Specifically, the statute gives the attorney general the
power to investigate and prosecute “all deceitful practices contrary to the plain rules of common
honesty,” or “acts tending to deceive or mislead the public.”161 Thus, unlike in federal fraud
cases, the state need not prove intent or scienter.162 Moreover, the Act applies to all suspected
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wrongdoing that an entity “shall have employed, or employs, or is about to employ.”163 All of
these factors point to what the courts have confirmed: the attorney general possesses “wide
discretion” to determine whether to begin an inquiry under the Martin Act.164 Reinforcing this
broad power is the fact that the courts do not have “the authority to judicially review” the
attorney general’s “exercise of discretion” regarding whether or not to investigate an entity.165
Also of relevance to nondisclosure actions are the broad investigatory powers given to
the attorney general.166 Prior to trial, the state may subpoena any documents deemed “relevant
or material to the inquiry.”167 Additionally, the state may subpoena witnesses to give oral or
written statements even before deciding to take a case to a grand jury for indictment, and these
witnesses are not given a right to counsel or a right against self-incrimination.168 If the Office
permits counsel (which is the typical practice), then counsel may be denied the ability to object
to questions and to take notes during the interview.169 Witnesses who fail to respond to a
subpoena “without reasonable cause” may be prosecuted for a misdemeanor.170 Significantly,
unlike in federal cases, the attorney general’s subpoena power continues even after he or she
decides to commence a legal proceeding.171 All of these steps may be taken in complete secrecy,
and any state official or witness involved who discloses information about the investigation may

whether “a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any
opposing inference one could draw from the facts”).
163
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be prosecuted for a misdemeanor.172 Alternatively, the investigation may be conducted publicly,
and the resulting “shock value and potential business damage of having a criminal investigation
conducted in public” has been said to give the Office “awesome power” and leverage against
defendants.173
This investigatory power is a large part of why other state attorneys general are unable to
replicate the investigations regarding nondisclosure that Cuomo undertook.174 Specifically, the
other state attorneys general that have often been active in the area of climate change have less or
no jurisdiction in this area. For instance, the state securities laws in Connecticut and
Massachusetts give the attorney general no jurisdiction over nondisclosure.175 In Rhode Island
and Vermont, the attorneys general possess only criminal jurisdiction,176 which is not a likely
avenue for pursuing nondisclosure cases.
One state whose attorney general may be able to partner with New York in investigating
companies for nondisclosure is California.177 Although the state securities law vests
investigative and enforcement power with a corporations commissioner, the law authorizes the
commissioner to work with the attorney general.178 Further, a separate statute expressly gives
the attorney general concurrent investigative and enforcement powers.179 The investigative
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powers of both the commissioner and attorney general are similar to those in New York.180 For
instance, the California Code permits the attorney general and commissioner to undertake private
and public investigations.181 Both officers also have the power to subpoena witnesses for
testimony and documents that are “relevant or material to the inquiry.”182 Individuals who fail to
comply with the subpoenas may be held in contempt.183 The broad reach of New York’s law to
already committed, ongoing, and future acts also exists in California.184 The one factor that may
hinder the efforts of the California attorney general in aligning himself or herself with New
York’s efforts is that the investigations by the attorney general and commissioner may not be
duplicative.185 Thus, if the two officers do not agree on what and how to pursue corporate
entities, it may prove difficult to provide the consistent support New York needs.
b. New York possesses the political willingness to address environmental and
climate change issues
As evidenced by the efforts of New York’s most recent Attorneys General, the Office is
more than willing to take on initiatives related to the environment and climate change. General
Cuomo headed a number of initiatives related to climate change in areas other than securities
disclosure. For example, Cuomo took an active role in several multistate actions against federal
agencies in which the states sought additional emissions regulations from the EPA.186 Since
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taking office in 2011, General Schneiderman has similarly been active in efforts to address
environmental issues. The following sections will detail his Office’s record on the environment
and argue that, although his Office has largely not pursued Cuomo’s initiative on securities
disclosure, resuming that issue is consistent with his agenda.
1. General Schneiderman and disclosure of environment-related risks in federal
securities filings
Soon after taking office, Schneiderman indicated his willingness to involve his Office in
environmental issues by invoking the Martin Act to subpoena five shale gas companies and three
energy companies.187 His Office alleged that the companies disclosed misleading and inaccurate
information to investors related to the use of oil and natural gas wells.188 The subpoenas sought
information about the methods used to calculate how much the wells would produce in future
years.189 Although it appears that no legal consequences resulted from these subpoenas (no
public information related to further steps or even the subpoenas have been released by the
Office190), this attempt to use the Martin Act to address nondisclosure of environmental risks
could still be seen as a somewhat successful effort to force federal action, and as a sign that his
Office is well equipped to continue pursuing this issue.

that the EPA improperly refused to consider a multistate petition for rulemaking related to carbon dioxide emissions;
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General (Jan. 2, 2008), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/cuomo-leads-coalition-15-states-against-epa-battlestates-right-fight-global-warming (lawsuit against the EPA to preserve states’ rights to regulate emissions from
automobiles); Press release, Attorney General Cuomo Leads 13-State Coalition to Defend the First-Ever Limits on
Global Warming Pollution from Facilities Like Power Plants and Oil Refineries, New York Attorney General (July
22, 2010), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-cuomo-leads-13-state-coalition-defend-first-everlimits-global (discussing multistate effort to intervene in litigation to defend a federal rule regulating emissions from
power plants).
187
See Ian Urbina, Lawmakers Seek Inquiry of Natural Gas Industry, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2011),
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About one month after Schneiderman subpoenaed the five shale gas companies, members
of Congress took notice. These members submitted letters to the SEC requesting that it open a
parallel investigation.191 Within a month, the SEC had issued subpoenas to an undisclosed
number of natural gas companies seeking the requested information.192 To date, no further
enforcement action in these cases has been announced or otherwise been made publicly
available, although one company announced that the SEC had concluded its investigation.193
Thus, although it appears that the SEC did not ultimately take enforcement steps or request
amended disclosure forms, the events suggest that the agency can be pressured through state and
federal actors to pay attention to nondisclosure issues.194
2. General Schneiderman’s Office has been active on climate change policy, and
working on disclosure of risks related to climate change is consistent with his
agenda
Despite Schneiderman’s lack of subsequent action regarding disclosure of environmental
risks, his Office has remained highly involved with other climate change initiatives, indicating
that resuming efforts to improve climate change-related disclosure would be consistent with his
agenda. These initiatives, which are discussed infra, include litigation or the threat of litigation
against federal agencies and submitting official comments to agencies.
Schneiderman’s Office has threatened litigation in several instances. For example, in
December 2012, Schneiderman and six other states notified the EPA that they intended to sue the
agency for failing to issue regulations, as required under the Clean Air Act, to control methane
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emissions from the oil and gas industries.195 Further, after the EPA missed the deadline to
finalize a rule limiting greenhouse gas emissions from new power plants, Schneiderman and 11
other states and cities notified the EPA of their intent to sue if the EPA did not expedite its
finalization process.196 Another major effort involved defending the state’s participation in a
multi-state climate change effort known as the “Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative” (RGGI).197
As Schneiderman stated after a New York court dismissed Thrun v. Cuomo,198 the lawsuit to
block state participation in RGGI, “[t]his is a significant victory . . . [and] I will continue to use
the full force of my office to vigorously defend sensible efforts that reduce climate change
pollution.”199
In addition to litigation, Schneiderman has utilized the public comment system that
federal agencies must use when considering policy initiatives. In April 2013, his Office
submitted comments criticizing the U.S. State Department for failing to accurately assess the
environmental effects of the Keystone Pipeline, and arguing that the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) did not adequately consider emissions from the pipeline.200 Along with 11 other
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states, Schneiderman also submitted comments to the EPA regarding proposed rules on
emissions from power plants.201
c. General Schneiderman’s Office has aggressively used the Martin Act to
address financial crimes generally
Like the two attorneys general who came before him, Schneiderman has actively made
use of the Martin Act to combat financial crimes.202 This fact, combined with his role in climate
change initiatives, suggests that resuming Cuomo’s disclosure efforts is consistent with his view
that the Attorney General’s Office should play a role in issues affecting both New York residents
and the nation.203 For example, in 2011, his Office sued the Bank of New York Mellon, a
national financial entity, for allegedly “overcharg[ing] customers for processing foreign currency
transactions” and cheating the state out of fees associated with the transactions.204 In 2012, the
Office filed a lawsuit against JPMorgan for allegedly defrauding consumers who purchased
mortgage-backed securities.205 In early 2014, Schneiderman also reached an agreement with
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BlackRock, the world’s largest money manager, wherein the company agreed to end an analyst
survey program that allegedly facilitated insider trading.206
d. The attorney general will more likely be able to pressure the SEC than private
plaintiffs
Although it may be thought that private plaintiffs could play a role in forcing the SEC to
act, there are a number of institutional barriers to this strategy. First, there is no right of action
for private parties under the state Martin Act; thus, the state Attorney General is the sole
enforcer.207 Second, while private parties do have an implied right of action under federal
securities laws, subsequent legislation on the issue makes it difficult for plaintiffs to bring
successful cases.208 For instance, plaintiffs must state “with particularity” the facts giving rise to
the alleged wrong, but are not entitled to even limited discovery before a court rules on whether
the lawsuit states a cause of action.209 Moreover, under existing regulations and Supreme Court
precedent, plaintiffs must have already suffered actual economic loss (unlike the state of New
York under the Martin Act, discussed supra) to file a claim.210
In addition to the practical difficulties facing private plaintiffs in bringing lawsuits, they
also are disadvantaged vis-à-vis state attorneys general with respect to the media. Specifically,
actions brought by the state often have “added credibility and weight” due to the status of the
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plaintiff as a government official.211 Thus, to bring sufficient publicity to securities disclosure
cases such that the political salience of the issue forces a reaction from the SEC, relying on a
state attorney general is a more promising strategy.212
iii.

Despite the lack of similar blue sky laws, other states can use non-litigation
methods to contribute to New York’s efforts

State attorneys general have frequently been involved in efforts to force the federal
government to take action on climate change.213 Although in the context of securities disclosure
they are often unable to initiate their own investigations, there are other ways in which they may
contribute to efforts to obtain further disclosure guidance. In the past, the two main ways in
which attorneys general have worked together to challenge federal agencies have been 1)
multistate litigation214 and 2) multistate coalitions that submit comments or petitions to agencies
regarding proposed policies (discussed infra). Of these two strategies, the latter is of most
relevance with respect to securities disclosure.
In a number of contexts, state attorneys general have submitted letters and official
comments to federal agencies urging them to adopt certain policies. For instance, in 2013, 21
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state attorneys general petitioned the U.S. State Department to extend the Keystone Pipeline.215
Also in 2013, a coalition of 13 attorneys general submitted a letter to the EPA urging the agency
to finalize a rule related to emissions standards for motor vehicles.216 Within the area of
securities disclosure, Cuomo’s 2007 petition to the SEC included 40 other groups representing
both state and non-state entities.217 Consistent with past practice, other state attorneys general
could lend their names and the weight of their offices to any additional petitions for interpretive
guidance submitted to the SEC.
Another avenue of potential importance is filing amicus briefs in court challenges to the
New York Attorney General’s authority under the Martin Act. Over the years, the New York
courts have been asked to rule on a number of issues stemming from the Martin Act, some of
which have challenged the ability of the attorney general to pursue action under the statute.218 In
the most recent challenge, People v. Greenberg, the states of Vermont and Connecticut filed an
amicus brief in support of the state’s use of the Martin Act and the state’s substantive argument,
which was that the lower courts properly denied summary judgment to defendants in a case
against an insurance company.219 Although state investigations for nondisclosure may not reach
the trial stage, preserving the attorney general’s authority to investigate and prosecute under the
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Martin Act remains important and controversial.220 Thus, as in the Greenberg case, it may be
important in the future for other states to file amicus briefs to support New York’s authority to
prosecute or investigate companies under the Martin Act.221
iv.

Criticism of state attorneys general as national policymakers

As the number of state attorneys general involved in national policy issues has grown,222
so has the criticism of their actions.223 Most of the criticism revolves around the basic reality
that state attorneys general are elected or appointed by individuals in only one state, but their
“enforcement efforts may have nationwide consequences” and can prompt both federal agencies
and potential defendants to permanently alter their behavior.224 This last section of the Note will
argue that, despite these criticisms, there is no inherent reason to keep attorneys general from
using their offices to address national issues such as climate change. In fact, Congress has, in
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See, e.g., Sarah Kelly-Kilgore, supra note 38 (noting that the law’s broad investigatory powers remain
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Devil’s Bargain: Wall St. & the Martin Act, N.Y. POST (Aug. 30, 2011), http://nypost.com/2011/08/30/devilsbargain-wall-st-the-martin-act/ (stating that many individuals oppose the attorney general’s aggressive use of the
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Island did not address this issue, but if such an issue were appealed in future cases, amicus briefs from other states
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other contexts, acknowledged and accepted the benefits of having state actors play a role in
shaping national policy.225
To begin with, critics have asserted that concurrent state enforcement creates a climate of
overenforcement that is harmful to regulated entities.226 However, the phenomenon of
overenforcement seems unlikely to occur – or at least very rarely if history is any guide.227
States are unlikely to overenforce because, like any government entity, they “are limited in
number and must ration their own scare resources.”228 Due to the existence of finite resources,
states “have no inherent incentive to maximize enforcement by taking action on every colorable
offense.”229 Additionally, states are more likely than private plaintiffs to consider the public
interest or social utility of taking action, further reducing the likelihood of overzealous
prosecution.230 Thus, if what the states are seeking is an optimal enforcement level, then
overenforcement is not necessarily a problem; “‘good’ enforcement is not the same thing as
maximum enforcement.”231
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Related to the image of attorneys general as overzealous prosecutors is the critique that
the generals take on certain cases or issues to further a partisan agenda.232 There is no question
that political will must exist for an attorney general to involve his or her office in a controversial
area.233 That said, the allegation that these attorneys general are motivated solely by partisan
politics is exaggerated. First of all, choosing office priorities is more complex than whether an
issue is popular amongst Democrats or Republicans, and in many cases, “the public policy
consequences are not always clear in advance.”234 Moreover, even if attorneys general work
together on an issue, each represents a different constituency with differing priorities, meaning
that the attorneys general “are a diverse group with diverse motivations.”235 While political
motivations remain a legitimate concern, it should also not be forgotten that their critics are often
pushing a regulatory or partisan agenda, and that the political agendas of state attorneys general
could be viewed as a needed counterweight to the political views of the agencies.236 Nor should
it be forgotten that any action undertaken by an attorney general could be viewed as politically
motivated.237 Most importantly, if the state action is meritorious aside from being “good
politics,” then whether the attorney general stands to gain from it is largely beside the point.
232
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Critics also assert that the attorney general of a single state should not be able to impose
its policy preferences on the rest of the nation.238 The securities market overseen by the federal
and state governments has both national and international dimensions, so this particular critique
of how attorneys general wield their authority carries more weight here than perhaps in other
contexts.239 However, the dominance of state policy does not have to be and, as Cuomo’s efforts
seemed to indicate, is not the ultimate goal with respect to disclosure of risks from climate
change. Relying on state investigations to establish a baseline may be both useful and one
method of holding companies accountable in the absence of federal action, but the issuance of a
single, uniformly applied SEC interpretation would be preferable and (at least in theory) would
provide clearer instructions, which is why Cuomo’s Office sought federal guidance.
Assuming that climate change disclosure is less of a priority to the SEC than other issues,
and that a failure to issue additional guidance is the result of the agency’s decisions on how to
manage its finite resources, then state pressure to issue such guidance may be criticized for
attempting to divert the agency’s resources to less important areas.240 There are two possible
responses to such criticism. First, the SEC is always the target of industry groups and other
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lobbying that would likely result in a shift of its resources away from their current distribution.241
Thus, basing opposition to state action on the idea that the state wants the agency to reprioritize
is not conclusive evidence of its harm. Second, assuming that a reprioritization is unwarranted,
the SEC and the state are independent actors, and the SEC, therefore, is not obligated to respond
at all to state demands.242 However, that lack of obligation is hardly sufficient to justify
prohibiting the state from acting on its own or requesting SEC action.
The motivation of the SEC in not responding also highlights why the intervention of the
state attorney general may be reasonable. Assuming that the SEC is not hostile to the idea of
clearer disclosure guidelines but feels it lacks the resources to focus on the issue, then the state
should step in and pursue its own investigations under the Martin Act in order to set a baseline
for disclosure practices. In this context, the choice is between no enforcement and state
enforcement, and assuming that there are harms to investors and companies from continued
uncertainty in the law, then the benefit of state intervention may outweigh the costs.243
Alternatively, assume that the SEC has not issued further guidance because it does not
view current disclosure practices as problematic.244 Pressure from the state attorney general may
241
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still be warranted as a means of promoting agency transparency and accountability. Specifically,
rather than allow the SEC to obfuscate the issue by stating in its 2010 interpretive release that it
would continue to monitor and seek public comment on the issue245 and then fail to follow
through on its promises, continued state action could force the agency to acknowledge its actual
policy position, and thereby increase the level of candor within the disclosure debate.246

IV.

Conclusion

Disclosure of financial risks arising from climate change poses an ongoing challenge for
companies and for law enforcement. To date, there is no consensus on when such risks should
be disclosed and how much detail ought to be included in federal securities filings. While the
SEC’s 2010 interpretive release has been viewed as one step toward resolving the debate, it is
also incomplete. The SEC itself recognized that the issuance of the release might not be the
Commission’s final statement on disclosure. In fact, the Commission promised to monitor the
situation, solicit public comment, and consider whether further guidance or rulemaking was
necessary.247 To date, this promise has been unfulfilled—at least in any public manner—and
disagreement about how and when to report climate change risks persists.
Whether the SEC’s failure to act on climate change disclosure since 2010 is the result of
inadvertent inattention or a belief that no further action is needed, the agency’s continued silence

greater availability of material, decision-useful information geared toward the needs of the broad majority of
investors . . . I can only conclude that the purpose of this release is to place the imprimatur of the Commission on the
agenda of the social and environmental policy lobby, an agenda that falls outside of our expertise and beyond our
fundamental mission of investor protection.”).
245
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246
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suggests the need for an outside actor to exert pressure on the SEC for clarification of its policy
beliefs. Armed with the Martin Act and the political will to serve as a leader on environmental
issues, the New York Attorney General is best positioned to be that actor. Not only can the
Attorney General use Cuomo’s two-part strategy to request interpretive guidance, but the Office
can, in the face of continued SEC inaction, directly pressure corporations to disclose information.
While it is uncertain about what the actual results of such efforts will be, without leadership from
New York, continued SEC inaction seems certain.
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